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Abstract
The paper describes two approaches to determinism: one focuses
on the features of global objects, such as possible worlds or models
of a theory, whereas the other’s concern is the possible behavior
of individual objects. It then gives an outline of an individuals-
based analysis of the determinism of theories. Finally, a general
relativistic spacetime with non-isometric extensions is described
and used to illustrate a conflict between the two approaches: this
spacetime is indeterministic by the first approach but determin-
istic by the second approach.
Keywords: determinism and indeterminism; general relativity; initial value
problem.
1 Introduction: two traditions of thinking about
determinism
There are two traditions of thinking about determinism, one centered upon
individual objects and the other centered upon an entire universe.1 The for-
mer tradition focuses on relatively small objects or processes (that is, small
if compared with the universe) and asks if these objects or processes could
evolve differently than they actually did. The cloak story that Aristotle tells
in De Interpretatione clearly exemplifies this way of thinking: a given cloak
might wear out, but it could be cut up first, that is, before wearing out. As
we deliberate whether or not the example argues in favor of indeterminism,
1Thanks to Thomas Müller, Oliver Pooley, Juliusz Doboszewski, Leszek Wroński,
Tadeusz Chmaj, Piotr Bizoń, and the audiences of the conference of the British Soci-
ety for the Philosophy of Science in 2015 and of the meeting of the Budapest-Kraków
research group in September 2014. The research was supported by the FNP research
grant “Mistrz 5/2011”. The support of the joint project of the Polish and Hungarian
Academies of Science âĂĲProbability, Causality and DeterminismâĂİ is as well gratefully
acknowledged.
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the data we look at are limited in space and time. It is of course the cloak
that matters, but some of its surroundings are relevant as well. Just think of
a particular person who is a potential cutter, a knife, the particular material
and weather conditions that make cloth wear out in time, but also make it
capable of being cut up. However large these surroundings are, if compared
to the cloak, we typically do not extend them to the entire universe. That
is, typically we are happy to limit the data for the determinism question to a
relatively small region of our spatiotemporal universe. This observation ap-
plies as well to another great picture we owe to Aristotle, that of tomorrow’s
sea battle. Although armadas of military vessels, together with sailors, their
commanders, weather conditions, etc., occupy a relatively large area of the
sea, this span is just a tiny spatiotemporal region of our entire world. In some
examples used in this tradition, namely those involving human agents and
their decisions, the data is even further restricted—to a particular person, or
more precisely, to some particular period in that person’s life. In this vein, to
illustrate future contingency and motivate his three-valued logic, Łukasiewicz
(1961) invokes a certain Piotr, who may come to the Castle Square in War-
saw tomorrow but as well may not come to the said location tomorrow.2 A
clear statement of this individuals-based approach to determinism is in Prior
(1962, p. 59):3
[...] [I]t seems perfectly possible to say that some things, but not
all things, have alternative possibilities of reaction to one and the
same stimulation. It is “open,” we might say, to a disturbed elec-
tron to jump to orbit A, and equally open to it to jump to orbit
B, but perhaps not open to it to jump to orbit C. In other words,
its dispositions may be such that with certain provocations it will
“jump to orbit A or to orbit B” without having any determinate
disposition to jump to orbit A, or any to jump to orbit B. [...]
Persons, say, have the power, without the necessity, of doing X
in certain circumstances; for oysters, on the other hand, doing X
may be necessary or impossible; and Y , say turning into a dragon,
may be something which no existing object has the power to do
[. . . ].
Judging by examples used in the literature, this local approach to de-
2That paper consists of a much earlier text that was read as Łukasiewicz’s opening
address as the Rector of the University of Warsaw in 1922.
3I am indebted to Jacek Wawer for drawing my attention to Prior’s paper.
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terminism and future contingents is a characteristic feature of theories of
agencies and modal logic, in particular that branch of logic that investigates
the combination of tense and modality. Philosophers’ debates aside, it is
this approach that is used in mundane and everyday’s contexts, in science
labs for instance. A chemistry student investigating a catalytic reaction may
wonder, seeing different outputs of seemingly the same process in subsequent
runs of her experiment: is the varying output due to the indeterministic na-
ture of the process, or to some differences in the reaction’s initial conditions
in subsequent runs of the experiment? In an attempt to clarify the issue,
she focuses on local matters of fact: is the catalyst, as well as other chemical
substances used, sufficiently similar in subsequent runs of the reaction? Are
the temperature, pressure, concentrations, and other relevant characteristics
the same in all these runs? The universe and its possible evolutions are not
part of the equation.
The second tradition, one that centers upon most global notions like that
of the universe, world or history, is invariably linked to Laplace’s vision. In
Laplace’s well known metaphor, a super intelligence is capable of “seeing”
the entire past and future of the universe, thanks to its grasp of an instanta-
neous state of the Universe and its knowledge of all of the forces acting in the
Universe. After the removal of epistemic overtones, signaled by words like
“knowledge”, or “seeing”, the vision forms the backbone of the current received
analysis of the determinism of theories. The basic intuition of this approach
is that of “once similar, always similar”, that is, a theory is deterministic iff
whenever two models of the theory agree on their initial segments, they agree
as wholes. To make the idea precise, three notions are required, namely (iso-
lated) systems of a theory, models of a theory, and isomorphism (similarity)
between segments of a theory’s models. As for the first notion, one begins
with asking what the world would be like, if a theory considered were true.
In addressing this question, one considers systems that fall in the scope of
a given theory, and assumes that such systems are isolated. To achieve the
isolation, a theory’s system is viewed as completely separate, as a (toy) pos-
sible world (cf. Butterfield (2005)). As for the notion of models, contrary
to appearances, it should not be confused with models in the sense of logic.
However, in spacetime theories models can be identified with appropriate dif-
ferential manifolds with some objects defined on them (cf. Earman (2008)).
The notion of isomorphism is called for in order to clarify the basic intuition
of the universe-based approach that determinism means that the similarity of
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the initial segments of models implies the similarity of whole models. Isomor-
phism needs to be a relation less strict than identity since models can differ
by merely some mathematical surplus structure, while representing the same
physical states.4 However, since theories are not understood in this approach
as formal theories, and a theory’s models are not simply models in the sense
of logic, isomorphism cannot be a standard notion as defined in logic (i.e.,
as a relation between models of a formal language, cf. Hodges (1993)). One
could think perhaps of this notion as relative to the mathematical structure
of a given theory: given a mathematical structure of a theory, an appropriate
notion of isomorphism will be definable. An example is general relativity in
which isomorphism is defined in terms of diffeomorphism between smooth
manifolds.5
Having introduced the required notions, we quote one formulation of the
received analysis of determinism:
Determinism is [. . . ] a matter of isomorphic instantaneous slices
implying that the corresponding final segments are isomorphic
(where ‘corresponding’ means ‘starting at the time of the instan-
taneous slice’). That is: we say that a theory is deterministic if,
and only if: for any two of its models, if they have instantaneous
slices that are isomorphic, then the corresponding final segments
are also isomorphic. (Butterfield, 2005)
Drawing a distinction between the two notions of determinism (and inde-
terminism) would be merely an exercise in pedantry if they agreed in their
verdicts. But, emphatically, they do not agree. In the next section (2) we will
discuss two cases, known from the literature, in which the two approaches
disagree. We will then sketch an analysis of individuals-based determinism
in section (3). Next we will proceed in section (4) to a case little discussed
in philosophical literature, that is, non-isometric extensions of spacetimes
of general relativity (GR). The case is classified as indeterministic by the
universe-based approach whereas the individuals-based approach yields the
verdict of determinism. The paper ends with “Conclusions”.
4This worry is not merely theoretical, since theories with gauge freedom (quite typical
in physics) exhibit exactly this feature.
5For technical details of the received analysis of determinism as well as a survey of
variants of this analysis, see Müller and Placek (2016).
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2 On space-invaders and buckling columns
Although analyses of determinism that appeal to possible worlds or models
of a theory are dominant in the literature, there have been a few attempts
to define determinism in terms of the behavior of individual objects. The
motivation for these attempts was provided by systems for which the received
analysis of determinism deliver counterintuitive verdicts. We discuss below
two systems of this sort, a system with a space invader and a buckling column.
2.1 Space-invaders
What is referred to as a space-invader is a system of Newtonian gravitation
whose essence is quite simple: a particle does not exist before time t0 and
at this time it emerges from spatial infinity, and continues to exist after-
wards. A system of this sort is exemplified by Xia’s (1992) system of five
masses interacting by the force of Newtonian gravitation. Given specific ini-
tial conditions, one of these masses escapes to spatial infinity at some (finite)
time t0. Since the theory of Newtonian gravitation respects the time-reversal
symmetry, a system symmetrical to the above, that is, one with the fifth
mass emerging from infinity at time −t0, counts for a system of Newtonian
gravitation.
Intuitively speaking, since before −t0 there is absolutely no factor indi-
cating that the particle will come to being, and if so, when this will happen,
the system seems to be indeterministic. Let us call the intuition underlying
this sentiment an “indeterminacy intuition”. In contrast to the indetermi-
nacy intuition, if we focus on each individual mass, we see that as soon as it
exists, it does not exhibit any trace of having alternative possible evolutions.
Building on the indeterminacy intuition, one envisages many alternative evo-
lutions of the spatiotemporal universe. These evolutions share some initial
segment (one with four existent masses), but differ with respect to when the
fifth mass comes to being. Among these evolutions, there is also one with no
fifth mass ever. In contrast, the individuals-based approach invites one to
posit just one possible evolution, one in which the fifth mass comes to being
at the specified time −t0 (remember that t0 is determined by the initial con-
ditions of the system we started with). The proponent of individuals-based
approach thus refuses to read the indeterminacy intuition as hinting at inde-
terminism, since no individual object of the system has alternative possible
evolutions.
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It is controversial which of the two diagnoses is more adequate, and this
controversy reflects, I believe, the fact that there are two notions of deter-
minism at hand, and the context of the debate does not indicate which one
is to be to used.
2.2 A buckling column
A buckling column is a system that has some symmetry at an initial phase,
and because of that symmetry tends to be classified as deterministic by the
received analysis of determinism, whereas it seems to be indeterministic (in-
tuitively speaking). This particular system is just an example of an initially
symmetric system that can be used to impugn Lewis’s (1983) analysis of de-
terminism. A buckling column is a rotationally symmetric system consisting
of a slim column in a uniform gravitational field and under a weight placed
symmetrically on the column’s top. To emphasize the system’s crucial fea-
tures, its rotational symmetry is perfect and the weight is critically heavy,
i.e., the column cannot retain its shape, it must fall. Systems of this sort are
studied in the elasticity theory, see e.g., Al-taee (2010).
Objections to the received analysis of determinism are based on a per-
ception that (1) the column will buckle, and, because of the symmetry of
its initial stage, i.e., before the buckling, (2) the buckling can be in any di-
rection. For a record, it should be mentioned, however, that the first part
of this diagnosis is not universally accepted. Given the perfect symmetry of
the system before the collapse, it might be argued that the symmetry should
persist after the collapse, which means that the column will not buckle but
become symmetrically flattened by the weight on its top. One might argue
against this view by appealing to the elasticity theory. Without actually
solving the dynamical equation (i.e., by providing exact initial conditions)
for a given system, the elasticity theory investigates the form of the state
function of the column, asking how this function behaves, i.e., where its min-
ima, maxima, and saddle points are. The analysis of a buckling column in
two dimensions (such a column can buckle in one of only two directions) says
that there are two stable solutions for the column, identified with buckling
in the two directions, and one unstable solution, identified with the sym-
metrical flattening of the column.6 This result, however, allows for different
6Wemention the analysis in 2 dimensions, as it is mathematically tractable—cf. Rosales
(2012).
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interpretations. One interpretation claims that there are only two possible
directions of buckling, classifying the unstable solution as impossible. On an
alternative interpretation, the stable solutions are identified with solutions
resulting from perturbed (i.e., slightly non-symmetrical) initial states, an un-
stable solution—with the evolution developing from a perfectly symmetrical
initial state. This latter interpretation thus says that given the ideal sym-
metry of the initial state, only one evolution, i.e., one without buckling, is
possible.
It thus seems that to use the buckling column in an argument for inade-
quacy of Lewisian analysis of determinism, we need to consider a world with
physics slightly different from Newtonian gravitation, just different enough so
that perfectly symmetric columns buckle there.7 Then, the argument goes,
by the symmetry of the column’s pre-fall stage, there are plenty of such pos-
sible worlds, each containing a column buckling in a (seemingly) different
direction.
Now, Lewis’s definition as well as the received view, opt for a relation less
stringent than identity to match segments of possible worlds (or segment of
a theory’s models).8 For the received view, the relation is that of isomor-
phism, and what this exactly means depends on the mathematical structure
of a theory at hand. Lewis prefers the relation of “duplication” that is to be
defined in terms of qualitative and “perfectly natural” properties and rela-
tions. Given that he takes the latter to be discoverable by science, there is
little harm, I believe, in identifying his “duplication” with “isomorphism” of
philosophers of science.
Turning finally to the argument, consider two models (of a slightly changed
Newtonian gravitation), in which the column buckles in different directions.
For the two models to be a witness for indeterminism, they should be non-
isomorphic but contain isomorphic initial segments. Clearly, the initial, that
is, pre-buckling, segments of these models are isomorphic; are then the whole
models non-isomorphic? Well, one model is the transform of the other by a
rotation over some angle. Naturally, the two models must then be isomor-
phic. After all, if rotational symmetry did not count as isomorphism, what
then would? Consequently, the column is classified as a deterministic system.
A natural idea of how to improve on the received analysis of determinism,
7This move is taken byBelot (1995).
8Lewis’s (1983) reasons for rebuking the use of identity in this context are different
from those of philosophers of physics, though, and stem from his rejection of overlapping
possible world in favor of the duplication of possible worlds.
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pursued by Belot (1995), Melia (1999), and Sattig (2015), is to take into
account possible evolutions of individual objects comprising the system. The
column may fall in different directions, because in one possible scenario a
particular individual object lands on the top surface of a fallen column, and
in another possible scenario—on the bottom surface of the fallen column. A
pair of models in which not one particle, but two particles, occupy the above
“alternative” positions (one on the top, the other on the bottom, surfaces of
the fallen column) seems to be a wrong representation of the modal situation
at hand. The feeling is that in such a case a global isomorphism relating
whole models betrays local isomorphism relating the initial segments, as the
latter pairs the particles that are not paired (identified) by the former. These
ideas are translated into this definition, due to Belot (1995):9
W is deterministic if, whenever W ′ is physically possible with
respect to W , and t, t′, and f : Wt → W ′t′ are such that f is an
[isomorphism] [. . . ], there is some [isomorphism] [. . . ] g : W →
W ′ whose restriction to Wt is f .
Thus, to prove that W is indeterministic, we need to find W ′ physically
possible with respect to W , times t, t′, initial segments Wt,W ′t′ of W,W ′t′ ,
resp., and a local isomorphism f : Wt → W ′t′ such that for every global
isomorphism g : W → W ′, f 6= g|Wt . Let us thus see how this definition
works in the case of a buckling column. We would like to prove that any
global isomorphism pairs constituents of the two columns badly, i.e., identifies
those constituents that a local isomorphism does not identify. But we shall
see that the argument does not go through—unless isomorphism relates bare
particulars.
Let symbols with a prime sign refer to objects inW ′, and symbols without
a prime sign — to objects inW . Let α(x) stand for a complete state, defined
in terms of perfectly natural properties and relations, of object x in the pre-
fall stage Wt of W . Similarly, let β(y) stand for a complete state of object
y in the post-fall segment W \Wt of W . To draw attention to a state at a
moment m of time, we will use subscript, like in αm(x). And t and t′ refer
to moments of buckling in the respective models.
9In the quote “duplication” is replaced by “isomorphism”, which may misrepresent
Lewis’s idea, as duplication might be seen as pairing both individuals and individuals’
states, whereas isomorphism is concerned with individuals’ states only—see more about it
later.
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One might naturally want to take for f the identity, but this is excluded
as the worlds are not allowed to overlap. Since the pre-fall segments are
rotationally symmetric, there is freedom which object x should be paired
with which object x′ by the relation on states, i.e., f(α(x)) = α′(x′). After
all, for every x1 that is the transform of x by some rotation OΘ, α(x) = α(x1).
(An analogous condition holds for states of constituents of W ′.) It follows
that f must preserve the rotational symmetry, in the following sense:
If f(α(x)) = α′(x′), then for every x1 such that x1 = OΘ(x) for
some angle Θ, f(α(x1)) = α′(x′).10
We thus pick an isomorphism f that preserves rotational symmetry;
clearly, it pairs point particles x and x′ that lie on the side surfaces of the
respective columns. Suppose that in post-fall segments, x and x′ land in dif-
ferent states in corresponding moments m,m′, say, one is on the top surface,
while the other—on the bottom surface, of the fallen columns.11 Then for
every global isomorphism g, g(βm(x)) 6= β′m′(x′). So, whatever the global
isomorphism g is, it must pair state βm(x) of x with a state of some y′ that
is not the same as x′, i.e.,12
g(βm(x)) = β
′
m′(y
′) where y′ 6= x′.
We would like to argue that not only for post-fall states, x and y′ are related
as above, but they are so related in the pre-fall segments. That is, to argue
that g restricted to Wt is not identical to f , i.e., g(αz(x)) 6= f(αz(x)) for
some moment z < t, we need:
g(αz(x)) = α
′
z′(y
′) for some corresponding moments z < t and z′ < t′.
Note, however, that both x′ and y′ lie on the side surface of the column in
W ′, and although in the post-fall segment they occupy altenative positions
(top vs. bottom), in the pre-fall segment they are related by some rotational
10One consequence of this condition is that point particles equidistant from the axis
of one column will be paired to point particles equidistant from the axis of the second
column.
11As the two columns fall in different directions, there must be some difference between
x and x′ in the post-fall segments; for brevity we use the mentioned difference in location.
12If x landed on the top surface, a isomorphism should relate it to some particle on the
top surface as well, so it cannot be x′, as it landed on the bottom surface.
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symmetry, x′ = O′Θ′(y′), so at any moment z′ < t′, their states must be the
same, α′z′(x′) = α′z′(y′). Accordingly, we get:
g(αz(x)) = α
′
z′(y
′) = α′z′(x
′) = f(αz(x)).
Thus, in contrast to the motivation underlying Belot’s definition, we ob-
tained that the restriction to Wt of any global isomorphism operative in the
buckling column example is identical to f , so the buckling column is, after
all, deterministic. Has anything gone wrong in the reasoning above? One
construal of the duplication relation (recall that Belot uses duplication rather
than isomorphism) is that it affords the pairing of objects in possible worlds
that goes over and above quantitative descriptions of these objects. Techni-
cally, the domain as well as the range of a duplication are, on this construal,
sets of constituents of possible worlds. Then it is immediate to see that in the
buckling column example, for some local duplication f , there is no global du-
plication g that extends f . Just take f that pairs, by the formula f(x) = x′,
objects x and x′ that in the post-fall segments land on the opposite sides
of the fallen columns (top vs. bottom). Any global duplication must thus
relate x (on the top of the first column) with some y′ 6= x′ (on the top of the
second column), i.e., g(x) = y′. Since y′ 6= x′, it is not the case that g|Wt = f .
In order for the relations of duplication or isomorphism to do the re-
quired job in the discussed definition of determinism, they need to relate
bare particulars. I take this as an argument against the definition. Now,
in contrast to the motivation underlying this definition, individual objects
are little present in it, as the job is done by local and global isomorphisms
(duplications). Shouldn’t thus individual objects themselves play a more dis-
tinctive role in an analysis of determinism? A firm step in this direction that
avoids reference to duplications or isomorphisms, is Sattig’s (2015, 5) notion
of “Strong Qualitative Determinism”:
A possible world w is deterministic iff for all times t, and for
all objects x in w, there is no object in any possible world with
the same laws of nature as w, which matches x in its qualita-
tive description up to t, but which does not match x in its total
qualitative description.
Applying this definition to the buckling column, possible worlds with buck-
ling columns that we discussed have the same laws of nature. Let us focus on
one such a world, and pick there a particle x on a column’s surface that ends
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up on the bottom surface after the fall. It is easy to think of another world
and a particle in it whose qualitative description before the fall matches the
qualitative description of x before the fall, but which does not land on the
bottom surface after the fall. The definition thus yields a verdict of indeter-
minism for the buckling column.
Sattig’s analysis still appeals to a Lewisian picture of non-overlapping
worlds, so to decide on determinism two objects are needed, each inhabiting
a different possible world, rather than just one object. This appeal to two
objects is not natural—typically, one relates indeterminism to one object
facing alternative possible future continuations. Moreover, this intuition finds
support in the treatment of the initial value problem, which is the main
source of information on the determinism and indeterminism of theories of
physics. One reason that the initial value problem is not well-posed is that
for given initial conditions there is more than one solution to a theory’s basic
equations. These are solutions for one system and they diverge despite being
identical for some arguments, which invokes an image of branching. In what
follows we will thus opt for a branching-style version of Sattig’s analysis, in
which one and the same individual object faces alternative evolutions, and
accordingly, possible worlds overlap. But it is worth noting that Sattig’s
analysis as well as our approach give similar diagnoses of our main example,
the non-isometric extensions of a GR spacetime.
3 An outline of individuals-based determinism
To sketch our individuals-based approach to the determinism of scientific
theories, we begin with an observation that a theory typically comes with
a verdict regarding what its individual objects are (individual objects are
somewhat localized in space and time, are bearers of states, and stand in
relations to themselves and other entities posited by the theory). Since some
theory may admit no individual objects, a verdict might be purely negative.
In some cases, the question of what are individual objects is not resolved by
a theory itself, but left for the theory’s interpretations.
Having the notion “individual objects admitted by a theory, under a given
interpretation” we ask next how a given theory describes the evolution of the
individual objects it admits. Is an object’s evolution unique in the whole
time considered? Or perhaps, it is unique but only locally, that is, in an
arbitrary small neighborhood around each set of allowable initial conditions,
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but globally non-unique? Or does the uniqueness of evolutions fail already
at the local level? These questions might turn out to be dauntingly hard,
but one does not need anything over and above the mathematical apparatus
of a theory to address them. In the spirit of the individuals-based approach,
as the first approximation, a theory is judged deterministic if each individ-
ual object it admits is described by this theory as having a globally unique
evolution for each allowable set of initial conditions. Otherwise, the theory
is judged to be indeterministic. Note, however, that a final analysis needs to
take into account the fact that multiple evolutions of states admitted by a
theory does not necessarily mean multiple evolutions of “real” states, as the
relation between states posited by a theory and “real” states might be many-
to-one. Thus, only multiple and dissimilar evolutions count as evidence for
indeterminism. The notion of dissimilarity is to be explained in terms of a
theory’s gauge freedom, which is an issue decided by a theory (or a theory’s
interpretation).
The determinism question, as described above, looks very much as one
for practitioners to decide, since they know the mathematical details and
interpretational subtleties of a theory best to address the question of the
uniqueness and the existence of solutions to the theory’s basic equations.
From the perspective of the philosophy of science, however, this description
of determinism is still off the mark: we have not provided a semi-formal
analysis of the determinism of theories that could be applicable to all, or
most, scientific theories. It is this task that philosophers of science strive to
achieve, and to which we now turn.
The definition of the determinism of scientific theories that is tailored to
accommodate the possible behavior of individual objects is that of Müller and
Placek’s (2016); here we only describe its essential ingredients, referring the
reader interested in the technical details to the aforementioned paper. Recall
that in the received analysis of determinism, the crucial notion is that of the
model of a theory. What is needed in the present approach is its analogon,
the modal representation of a system of a theory. A distinctive feature of
the present approach is that it requires a means to represent alternative
possible evolutions of an individual object (as well as of the entire world),
as conceived by a theory at hand. Such a means—a modal representation of
a theory’s system—is thus modally thick, if the theory considered allows for
alternative possible evolutions, i.e., by having multiple dissimilar solutions to
its basic equations (for the same initial conditions). Consequently, a theory’s
indeterminism is an internal feature of its modal representation. This is in
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stark contrast to the received view on determinism, as the notion of models
it uses is modally thin: a model is not capable, on its own, of representing
alternative possibilities; determinism (and its negation) are features of a class
of models rather than of a single model.
A choice of a modally thin concept of model over a modally thick concept
of modal representation is driven by metaphysical preferences. The choice
reflects the old debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans: does the world,
or a model of the world, comprise only those things that actually happen,
or does it accommodate things as well that might have happened, or may
happen in the future? I surmise that for a full-fledged notion of indetermin-
ism, one needs real possibilities; hence modal representations offer a more
adequate format than modally thin models.13
What is then a modal representation of a system of a given theory? In
essence, it is the set of (overlapping) dissimilar solutions to the theory’s basic
equations, for a system of that theory. Accordingly, if a theory permits just
one solution for a system considered, its modal representation contains only
one solution. But a modal representation can contain many overlapping
solutions. For an example, consider the system of Norton’s (2008) dome,
which is a point mass located on the top of a particularly shaped dome, in a
uniform gravitational field. The system’s modal representation is constructed
from the set of functions rb : < → <, b ∈ <+ ∪ {∞}, each representing the
point mass’s position in time, as being on the top of the dome till time b, and
sliding down its slope after b.14 In the the construction, the set of solutions
for the system is redescribed, with the aim of disclosing two features: (1) the
ordering inherent to the spatio-temporal (temporal) and modal structure of
the solutions, and (2) the assignment of states. In the example of Norton’s
dome, the resulting ordering is a tree-like partial ordering of possible moments
of the system (aka branching-time, BT),15 and the assignment relates possible
moments to positions of the point mass (for details, see Müller and Placek
(2016).)
13For a discussion of modal notions, and Humean notions, of determinism, see Placek
et al. (2014).
14Observe that a system’s description which require the point mass to be on the dome’s
top since −∞ in time makes all the solutions with b 6= ∞ similar, as they all are related
one to the other by the time-translation symmetry. A different description of the system
does not imply the time-translation symmetry, however.
15 “Tree-like” means that the ordering has a single trunk and there is no backward
branching, i.e., (x 6 z ∧ y 6 z)→ (x 6 y ∨ y 6 x).
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The ordering part of a modal representation depends on the kind of the-
ory considered. For all non-relativistic theories, it is the BT ordering. Special
relativity and some GR spacetimes require the ordering of branching space-
times, (BST, see Belnap (1992)). In general, GR spectimes (including those
with closed time-like curves) seem to call for a “patch-wise” BST ordering of
Placek (2014).
The definition of determinism is particularly simple if the ordering part of
modal representations is BT (this option is explored in detail in Müller and
Placek (2016)). Maximal chains of moments (i.e., of simultaneity slices) are
taken for maximal modally consistent subsets of the ordering, and interpreted
(after an assignment of states) as possible histories. A modal representation
is said to be indeterministic iff it contains more than one possible history. A
theory is indeterministic iff some system of that theory has an indeterministic
modal representation. Once a concept of modal consistency for other relavant
orderings (i.e., other than BT) is agreed upon,16 the above definition carries
over to theories with modal representations that are not based on BT.
Reflecting on the above analysis, to claim the indeterminism of a modal
representation, in its ordering part one needs to find what Placek et al. (2014)
called a “modal fork”, i.e., a fork whose arms are contained in alternative
histories. A modal fork thus signals alternative possible evolutions. In a
search for cases of individual-based indeterminism, one needs thus to attend
to modal forks resulting from the behavior of individual objects. The recipe
will not work for theories, the modal representation of which involves the BT
ordering, since BT is too frugal to capture the world’s spatial aspect, and
hence cannot represent individual objects.
4 A GR system: indeterministic universe-wise
but deterministic individuals-wise
We are now about to show that the distinction between universe-based de-
terminism and individuals-based determinism matters: we will exhibit a GR
system that is indeterministic universe-wise by the received analysis, but is
deterministic individuals-wise. The problem is known as non-isometric exten-
sions of GR spacetimes. In philosophical literature non-isometric extensions
of some GR spacetimes were described in Earman (1995) and Belot (2011);
16 For a discussion of various relavant concepts of modal consistency, see Müller (2014).
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the latter takes them as evidence for indeterminism of GR.
4.1 Technical prerequisites
Let us review the required terminology.17 An n-dimensional GR spacetime
is a pair 〈M, gab〉, where M is a connected n-dimensional Hausdorff mani-
fold (without boundary) that is infinitely differentiable (smooth) and gab is
a smooth, non-degenerate, pseudo-Riemannian metric of Lorentz signature
(+,−, . . . ,−) defined onM . ManifoldM is Hausdorff iff it satisfies the Haus-
dorff property, which says that for every pair 〈x1, x2〉 of distinct points in M
there are non-overlapping open subsets O1 and O2 of M such that xi ∈ Oi
(i = 1, 2). It is said that two spacetimes 〈M, gab〉 and 〈M ′, g′ab〉 are isometric
if there is a diffeomorphism (smooth bijection) ϕ : M → M ′ such that the
induced pull-back function ϕ∗ satisfies ϕ∗(g′ab) = gab. A spacetime 〈M ′, g′ab〉
is an extension of 〈M, gab〉 if there exists an embedding Λ : M 7→M ′ (i.e., Λ
is a diffeomorphism onto its image) and Λ∗(g′ab |Λ(M)) = gab and Λ(M) 6= M ′.
A spacetime is maximal iff it has no extension.
With each point p ∈ M there is an associated vector space, aka tangent
space,Mp, on which gab induces a cone structure, so that each vector ξa ∈Mp
is either timelike, or null, or spacelike. Time-orientable spacetimes permit a
distinction between future and past lobes of light-cones; technically, a time-
orientable spacetime has a continuous timelike vector field on “its” manifold.
A smooth curve γ : I →M (where I is an open interval of <) is timelike
(resp., spacelike, or null) iff its tangent vector ξa at each point in γ[I] is
timelike (resp., spacelike, or null). A curve is causal if its tangent vector
at each point is either null or timelike. A curve is inextendible iff it has
no endpoints. A geodesic in a spacetime 〈M, gab〉 is a curve γ : I → M
that satisfies, for every vector ξa ∈ Mp (p ∈ γ[I]) tangent to the curve
the condition ξa∇aξb = 0, where ∇a is the (unique) derivative operator
compatible with gab. For any set S ⊆ M , the domain of dependence of S,
written D(S), is the set of points p ∈M such that every inextendible causal
curve through p intersects S. S is an achronal subset of M iff no two points
in S can be joined by a timelike curve.
17Explanations of the mathematics of GR can be found in mathematically-oriented
books on GR, like e.g., Malament (2012).
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4.2 Determinism and the initial value problem in GR
We need now to explain how non-isometric extensions of a GR spacetime are
related to the determinism question. The determinism question presupposes
a notion of a system evolving in time. This latter notion is typically not
well-defined in general relativity, as usually a GR spacetime does not come
with a distinguished time. Yet, a somewhat similar issue can be considered in
GR: suppose we are given a 3-dimensional space with possibly some data on
it. (Technically it is a manifold with a metric “ ‘appropriate for space”, i.e..,
a Riemannian metric). The question now is: can this space be uniquely ex-
tended to a 4-dimensional spacetime, i.e., to a manifold with the Lorentzian
metric that satisfies the properties required from a manifold representing a
GR spacetime (listed above), and in which Einstein field equations (EFE)
hold? The answer crucially depends on the kind of data assumed on the
space and on the properties the sought-for spacetime is supposed to have.
As for the latter, the relavant factors is the existence of a matter field, and
(if it is assumed to exists) the kind of model for the matter field; another
issue is the occurence of the cosmological constant in EFE. However, given
the extension problem we will consider, a simple case is enough for our pur-
pose. We focus upon spacetimes with a vanishing Ricci tensor, the so-called
vacuum spacetimes and consider EFE without the cosmological constant. A
satisfactory data for this case consists of a Riemannian metric g˜ and sym-
metric covariant 2-tensor k˜ that represents incremental changes of the metric
in the direction normal to Σ. In this case the initial value problem amounts
to constructing a 4-dimensional manifold M with a Lorentz metric g and an
embedding i : Σ → M such that if k is the second fundamental form on
i(Σ) ⊂ M , then i∗(g) = g˜ and i∗(k) = k˜, where i∗ is the pull-back function
induced by embedding i. Further, there is a set of equations relating g˜ and
k˜, known as (vacuum) constraint equations, which guarantee the satisfaction
of EFE in a sought-for spacetime. Space Σ with the tensors g˜ and k˜ that
satisfy the (vacuum) constraint equations are said to form a (vacuum) initial
data set 〈Σ, g˜, k˜〉.
A result that is highly relevant to the initial value problem in the vacuum
case has been obtained by Choquet-Bruhat and Geroch (1969) in the context
of globally hyperbolic spacetimes. A hyperbolic spacetime has particularly
nice causal properties. To recall, 〈M, gab〉 is said to be globally hyperbolic iff
there is an achronal subset S ⊆M , whose domain of dependence is the whole
spacetime. One consequence of this definition is that a globally hyperbolic
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spacetime can be foliated by Cauchy surfaces (though the foliation is non-
unique). Choquet-Bruhat and Geroch restrict their attention to globally
hyperbolic spacetimes that could be developed from a given vacuum initial
data set which (1) are vacuum solutions to EFE and (2) such that the image
of space Σ by the embedding is a Cauchy surface in 〈M, g, k〉. A spacetime
satisfying these conditions is called a “vacuum Cauchy development” (VCD)
of the initial data set. Note that condition (2) above implies that VCD is a
globally hyperbolic spacetime. The theorem says:
Theorem 1 Let 〈Σ, g˜, k˜〉 be an initial vacuum data set. Then there is a
unique, up to isometry, maximal VCD 〈M, g, k〉 of 〈Σ, g˜, k˜〉.
The phrase “unique up to isometry maximal VCD” means that if there is
another maximal VCD 〈M ′, g′, k′〉 of the same initial data set, then there is a
time-orientation preserving isometry ϕ : M →M ′. Thus, taking isometry for
an identifier of vacuum spacetimes of GR (which is a typical move), the result
ensures the uniqueness of maximal globally hyperbolic spacetimes compatible
with vacuum initial data sets.
There has been a considerable controversy of how to interpret this the-
orem, which is directly related to the so-called Strong Cosmic Censorship
Conjecture (SCCC). After all, the theorem concerns globally hyperbolic de-
velopments only: it puts no restrictions on other developments of an initial
vacuum data set. This raises the question whether a maximal globally hyper-
bolic development of an initial data set can be further extended (of course,
the resulting extension cannot be globally hyperbolic). SCCC adresses this
question, claiming that “for generic initial data to Einstein’s equations, the
maximal globally hyperbolic development has no extension”. (Ringström,
2009, 188).18
Non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes of GR typically involve causal anoma-
lies, like closed timelike curves (CTC’s); one might thus think, and this
thought is the content of one interpretation of SCCC, that non-globally hy-
perbolic developments of initial data sets are not physical. An alternative
interpretation of SCCC, and one used in recent research of the initial value
problem in GR (cf. Ringström (2009)) is that the non-globally hyperbolic
developments of initial data sets are rare, in some measure-theoretical sense,
with a measure defined on the space of relevant solutions to EFE. Without
18The idea of SCCC is due to Penrose (1969); since then it has received many formula-
tions.
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entering here a voluminous debate on SCCC, we opt for the latter interpreta-
tion, as there is arguably no data supporting non-physicality of the discussed
solutions. In a slogan, “rare” does not mean “unphysical”.
The Choquet-Bruhat and Geroch theorem has a consequence that evi-
dence for indeterminism of GR (if there is one) in the vacuum case must
consist of multiple non-isometric extensions of a maximal globally hyperbolic
vacuum spacetime. By this theorem, an initial vacuum data set has a unique
(up to isometry) maximal VCD, i.e., a maximal globally hyperbolic space-
time satisfying EFE. Thus, if this initial data set has multiple non-isometric
developments satisfying EFE, these development must be non-isometric ex-
tensions of the maximal VCD determined by the data set. The problem of
the determinism of GR (at least one related to the initial value problem) boils
thus down to whether some maximal globally hyperbolic spacetime (satisfy-
ing EFE) has multiple non-isometric extensions (satisfying EFE).
4.3 Non-isometric extensions of Taub spacetime
We will describe below the construction of multiple non-isometric extensions
of Taub spacetime. Our discussion is based on the paper of Chruściel and
Isenberg (1993), which investigates as well a more realistic class of spacetimes,
polarized Gowdy spacetimes, that have multiple non-isometric extensions.
But since they are mathematically more demanding, we do here a simpler
case of extensions of Taub spacetime.
Taub spacetime is a vacuum solution to EFE; the manifold is M =
(t−, t+)× S3 and metric g is given by
ds2 = −U−1dt2 + (2l)2U(dψ + cos Θdϕ)2 + (t2 + l2)(dΘ2 + sin2 Θdϕ2),
where and m and l are real positive constants, Θ, ϕ and ψ are Euler coordi-
nates on the 3-sphere S3, t± = m± (m2 + l2)1/2, and
U(t) =
(t− − t)(t− t+)
l2 + t2
.
Note that U(t±) = 0, and hence the metric is not defined at t±. Taub space-
time is globally hyperbolic and maximally so, the Cauchy surfaces being iden-
tified by the condition t = const for t ∈ (t−, t+). As Newman, Tamburino and
Unti (1963) showed, by using appropriate coordinate transformations 〈M, g〉
can be extended above t+, the result being two non-hyperbolic spacetimes
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〈M↑+, g↑+〉 and 〈M↑−, g↑−〉, known as Taub-NUT spacetimes. In a simi-
lar vein, Taub spacetime can be extended below t− into two non-hyperbolic
spacetimes 〈M↓+, g↓+〉 and 〈M↓−, g↓−〉. Each 〈M↑+, g↑+〉, 〈M↑−, g↑−〉, 〈M↓+, g↓+〉,
and 〈M↓−, g↓−〉 satisfies EFE and contains closed timelike curves in the re-
gion new with respect to M . As showed by Chruściel and Isenberg (1993),
the pair M↑+, M↑− and the pair M↓+, M↓− are isometric.
To produce non-isometric extensions of Taub spacetime we need to glue
together an upward extension together with a downward extension of Taub
spacetime. “Gluing” means, in mathematical parlance, finding an equivalence
relation ≡ on the union of two manifolds, say M↓+ ∪M↑−, and then taking
the set of equivalence classes with respect to this equivalence relation. The
result is the quotient structure (M↓+ ∪M↑−)/ ≡.
Consider now four results of the gluing (for the equivalence relation used,
consult Chruściel and Isenberg (1993, 1619)):
Mab = (M↓a ∪M↑b)/ ≡, where a, b ∈ {−,+},
each result being associated to metric gab, defined in terms of g↑a and g↓b.
Each 〈Mab, gab〉 is a non-hyperbolic extension of Taub spacetime 〈M, g〉 and
it satisfies EFE. As for isometries, there are the following results (Chruściel
and Isenberg (1993, thm. 3.1)):
1. 〈M+−, g+−〉 is isometric to 〈M−+, g−+〉.
2. 〈M++, g++〉 is isometric to 〈M−−, g−−〉;
3. yet, 〈M−−, g−−〉 is not isometric to 〈M−+, g−+〉, and
4. 〈M++, g++〉 is not isometric to 〈M+−, g+−〉.
The above non-isometric extensions of Taub spacetime provide evidence
for indeterminism in the sense of Butterfield’s (1989) definition of determin-
ism, which is a universe-based analysis, tailored to applications to GR. It
says:
A theory with models 〈M,Oi〉 is S-deterministic, where S is a
kind of region that occurs in manifolds of the kind occurring in the
models, iff: given any two models 〈M,Oi〉 and 〈M ′, O′i〉 containing
regions S, S ′ of kind S respectively, and any diffeomorphism α
from S onto S ′:
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if α∗(Oi) = O′i on α(S) = S ′, then:
there is an isomorphism β from M onto M ′ that sends S to S ′,
i.e. β∗(Oi) = O′i throughout M ′ and β(S) = S ′.
Here Oi stand for geometric object fields that either are definable in terms of a
spacetime’s metric, or characterise the matter fields of the spacetime. In our
(vacuum) case the definition simplifies considerably, since in the absence of
objects not definable in terms of a metric, the notion of isomorphy coincides
with that of isometry, thus β can be an isometry and the condition on α∗
above concerns only objects defined in terms of a metric.
To check that the definition yields the verdict of indeterminism of GR,
note that spacetime 〈M++, g++〉 contains region S++ = Λ++[M ], and space-
time 〈M+−, g+−〉 contains region S+− = Λ+−[M ], where Λab : M → Mab
is an embedding, which ensures that 〈Mab, gab〉 is an extension of 〈M, g〉.
For diffeomorhism α we take α = Λ+−(Λ++)−1 : S++ → S+−. Then the
push-forward α∗ induced by α satisfies α∗(g++) = g+− (by the condition on
embedding), and hence—α∗(Oi) = O′i for any object field defined in terms of
the metric. On the other hand, however, 〈M++, g++〉 and 〈M+−, g+−〉 are
not isometric, by Chruściel and Isenberg’s result quoted above. It follows
that GR is indeterministic.
Let us next turn our attention to the evolution of individual objects (mass-
less and massive particles) in GR. A notion relavant to a particle’s evolution
in GR is that of (null or timelike) geodesics, which are explained as trajecto-
ries of unaccelerated probe particles. Here “probe” means that the particles
do not alter the geometry of the spacetime they move in. By EFE, a particle’s
motion is governed by the spacetime’s metric, but the metric is influenced by
the particle’s motion as well. However, the influence of probe particles on the
spacetime’s metric is assumed to be negligible; the probe particle is thought
of as moving in the background (independent of it) metric. But what are the
trajectories of “real” particles in GR? A dominant tradition, going back to
Einstein and Grossmann (1913), assumes that particles of sufficiently small
mass and size move along geodesics. The tradition is supported by topolog-
ical theorems to the effect that, given certain idealisations are assumed, the
particle moves along a geodesic. A theorem to this effect is in Ehlers and
Geroch (2004); the paper also gives reference to earlier results of this sort.19
19Of course, a direct way to learn a particles trajectory is to find an exact solution to
a (relevant ) problem of motion of GR, yet there are only very few exact solutions of this
kind.
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In what follows, we thus consider a Taub spacetime inhabited by only such
particles that satisfy the required idealizations. In this case all individual
objects can be safely assumed to move along geodesics.
Suppose thus that a photon moves along a null geodesic in Taub space-
time. This spacetime has two non-isometric extensions, 〈M++, g++〉 and
〈M+−, g+−〉. What happens to the photon as it leaves the initial region?
That is, what does the photon’s geodesic look like as the photon leaves Taub
spacetime and proceeds to a new region of one of the two extensions? The
answer is that there are two classes of null geodesics in Taub spacetime;
geodesics of the first class are completed in one extension and geodesics of the
other class—in the second extension (cf. Hawking and Ellis (1973, 170-178)
and Chruściel and Isenberg (1993, Lemma 3.2)). Thus, the photon’s evolu-
tion appears predestined: depending on which class the photon’s geodesic
belongs to, it will continue to one extension or the other.
One can get a better insight into the case at hand by considering the
modal representation of the extensions of Taub spacetime. To obtain this
modal representation, one glues together all 〈Mab, gab〉 (a, b ∈ {−,+}) into
non-Hausdorff manifold M˜ = 〈M++ + M+− + M−+ + M−−〉; each 〈Mab〉
comes out as a Hausdorff sub-manifold of it.
A photon travelling through the image of Taub spacetime in the modal
representation M˜ moves along a null-geodesic. If it has two possible evolu-
tions, say to (the images of) M++ and M+−, respectively, its geodesic must
split, one path continuing in one extension and the other in the second ex-
tensions. That is, for the photon’s indeterministic evolution, there should be
two geodesics that coincide in a region of (the image of) Taub spacetime, but
then continue separately, each in the (image of) of different Mab. Note that
the fact that two geodesics coincide in a region implies that the geodesics
intersect at a point and their tangent vectors at that point agree.
Can such bifurcating geodesics occur in a Hausdorff manifold (or in a
non-Hausdorff manifold)? The following relevant fact obtains in a manifold
(Hausdorff or not), equipped with a metric:
Fact 1 If a metric g is appropriately continuous, given a point p and a vector
at this point, in some neighborhood of p there is a unique geodesic that passes
through the point and whose tangent at this point coincides with the vector.20
20See e.g. Chruściel (2011, p. 6). Typically, a metric of a GR spacetime meets the
mentioned continuity requirement. For examples of metrics that do not satisfy it and
accordingly generate non-unique bifurcating geodesics, see (Chruściel, 1991, Appendix F).
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Note that the fact concerns only the local existence and uniqueness of a
geodesic. However, for a Hausdorff manifold M , this local result can be
strengthened to a global property: given the continuity condition on g, a
point p ∈M and a vector ξ at p, there is a unique maximal geodesic γ : I →
M such that (1) γ(0) = p and (2) γ˙(0) = ξ, where γ˙(0) stands for a tangent
to γ at point p = γ(0). Maximality of γ means that if there is some other
geodesic γ′ : I ′ → M satisfying conditions analogous to (1) and (2) above,
then I ′ ⊆ I. In sum, (given the continuity assumption on g), no geodesics
can bifurcate in Hausdorff manifolds, but non-Hausdorff manifolds might be
conductive to bifurcating geodesics. One might thus hope that in the non-
Hausdorff modal representation M˜ there is room for bifurcating geodesics,
and hence, for alternative possible evolution. This hope is to be shattered.
To begin, since Taub spacetime (and hence its image by an isometry) is
Hausdorff, a photon’s geodesic in (the isometric image of) Taub spacetime is
unique. Thus, if a bifurcation occurs, it must occur on a boundary between
(the image of) Taub spacetime and the new regions of the extensions. What
should this boundary look like to enable bifurcation? The answer is related
to a failure of the Hausdorff property: for this to be possible, as the photon
approaches the boundary, its geodesic should approach a non-Hausdorff pair
of points, (i.e., a pair witnessing the non-Hausdorffness of the manifold), such
that each point of the pair belongs to the new region of a different exten-
sion. More technically, in the modal representation, the intersection of the
geodesic with (the image of) Taub spacetime should not have a supremum;
rather there should be two (or more) minimal elements of the set of its upper
bounds—these elements are witnesses for non-Hausdorffness.
Now, the surprising feature of the construction of Taub-NUT extensions
(shared by constructions of Misner extensions or extensions of a polarized
Gowdy spacetime) is that no geodesic approaching the boundary faces a non-
Hausdorff pair of points. There is no bifurcation of geodesics, accordingly.
One may wonder where are these non-Hausdorff pairs located in the modal
representation for the extensions of Taub spacetime? To hint at a diagnosis,
consider two geodesics travelling through (the image of) Taub spacetimes
towards different extensions. (We know from the above that in these cir-
cumstances they can cross at a point but cannot coincide over an extended
interval.) As such geodesics cross the boundary between Taub spacetime and
the new region of a respective extension, they define two points. Now, no
matter which two geodesics of this sort one takes, they define the pair of
points that is a non-Hausdorff pair. Thus, in order to have a non-Hausdorff
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pair, we need to consider two geodesics separated, rather than coinciding in
Taub spacetime. But such non-Hausdorff pairs are not conductive to bifur-
cation.21
To sum up, no photon’s geodesics can bifurcate in the modal represen-
tation of the extensions of Taub spacetime. This result carries over to all
massless and massive particles. Since geodesics in the modal representa-
tion represent possible evolutions of individual objects, no individual object
in Taub spacetime has multiple alternative possible evolutions that consist
in travelling to non-isometric extensions of that spacetime. Accordingly,
Taub spacetime together with its non-isometric extensions is not a case of
individuals-based indeterminism.
Arguably, the same verdict can be reached by Sattig’s definition of “Strong
Qualitative Determinism” (see Section 2.2), provided that an object’s quali-
tative description is encoded by the object’s geodesic. For possible worlds we
take extensions 〈Mab, gab〉 of Taub spacetime. We focus on a given 〈Mab, gab〉
and pick a particle x in the image Λab(M) ⊂ Mab of Taub spacetime. The
qualitative behavior of x in Λab(M) is given by its geodesic γ. Suppose
now that in some other extension Ma′b′ there is a particle, which behaves in
Λa
′b′(M) ⊂ Ma′b′ exactly like x in Λab(M). This means that its geodesic γ′
in the image of Taub spacetime must coincide with geodesic γ of x in the
respective image of Taub spacetime. In mathematical parlance, (Λab)−1[γ]
and (Λa′b′)−1[γ′] must denote one and the same geodesic in M . As we argued
above, this geodesic inM has a unique maximal extension, and this extension
belongs to just one extended spacetime 〈Mab, gab〉. Thus, there are no two
particles, each beloning to a separate extended spacetime, whose qualitative
descriptions match in (corresponding images of) Taub spacetime, but do not
match elsewhere.Thus, as far as the extensions of Taub spacetime go, GR is
Strongly Qualitatively Deterministic.
5 Conclusions
We described two traditions of thinking about determinism and indetermin-
ism: the dominant tradition analyzes these concepts in terms of global no-
21One may further wonder how non-Hausdorff pairs so peculiarly located emerge. The
answer is that the manifolds considered are constructed as quotient structures of some
auxiliary manifolds with respect to an equivalence relation resulting from a problem’s
symmetry, cf. Hawking and Ellis (1973, 170-173).
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tions, like possible worlds or models of a theory, whereas the minority view
defines them in terms of the possible behavior of individual objects. We
revisited a clash between these traditions that issued in the context of ana-
lyzing systems whose initial segments are symmetric: counterintuitively such
systems are diagnosed as deterministic by the dominant approach. We de-
scribed how, by paying attention to possible evolutions of individual objects,
the minority approach attempted to deliver an opposite verdict.
Next we provided an outline of an analysis of individuals-based determin-
ism, the essence of which is the concept of modal representation of a system
of a given theory. The modal representation for a given system contains mul-
tiple solutions (for fixed initial conditions) to the theory’s basic equations,
if there are such multiple solutions. An important structure, as it signals
the presence of alternative possible evolution, is a modal fork. A theory is
said to be indeterministic iff the modal representation of one of its systems
contains a modal fork, otherwise a theory is said to be deterministic. Fur-
ther, a theory is indeterministic individuals-wise iff a modal fork in a modal
representation of that theory is due to the behavior of an individual object
admitted by the theory.
Finally, we exhibited a case from current physics, in which the universe-
based approach and the individuals-based approach deliver opposite verdicts
concerning determinism. The non-isometric extensions of Taub spacetime
are viewed as indeterministic by the received (universe-based) approach, but,
since no individual object has alternative possible evolutions in this system,
the system is judged as deterministic by the individuals-based approach.
With this clash of verdicts in sight, imagine Laplace’s demon residing in
Taub spacetime. As it looks to the future, the demon perceives two dissimilar
possible extensions of the spacetime. The demon realizes that no matter
how much it knows about Taub spacetime (in which it resides), it cannot
learn which of these extensions will come to pass. The demon concedes
that “the future is not present before its eyes”, that is, Taub spacetime is
indeterministic. Next the demon turns to small objects in Taub spacetime,
all those little guys, photons, protons, cloaks, ships, sailors and the like. As
the spacetime has multiple extensions, some individual objects should face
multiple evolutions, like the cloak from Aristotle’s story that might be cut
up as well as wearing out first. The demon contemplates the physics of
Taub spacetime and its extensions and learns that, given the position and
the speed of each object, the object has exactly one possible evolution. No
individual object faces multiple possible evolutions. Aristotle’s cloak does
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not fit Laplace’s demon.
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